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The present study examines the impact of several industry characteristics on the propensity to 
collude using a dataset on the existence of collusion across Dutch industries during the late 
1990s and early 2000s. The results of the Probit model with sample selection indicate that our 
sample of Dutch concerted practices is non-random in the sense that it only consists of anti-
competitive agreements that were subject of an antitrust immunity behavior. Our bivariate 
probit model with sample selection indicates that concerted practices are less likely to be seen 
in service industries relative to manufacturing industries. The results also show that it is more 
likely that firms engaged in concerted practices in unconcentrated industries. Furthermore, 
we could not find a non-linear relationship between concentration and the presence of 
collusion. There is also strong evidence from all the regressions that concerted practices are 
less likely in industries where entry is more possible. Interestingly, our estimation results 
indicate that there is a positive correlation between cartel prevalence and import penetration, 
which implies that import competition did not discipline firm behavior and foreign importers 
joined the cartel paradise in the Netherlands. As to the role of measures of asymmetry on 
concerted practice prevalence, the association between patenting activity and propensity to 
engage in collusion is ambiguous in the current setting, while advertising intensity, as the 
second measure of asymmetry, is associated with increased likelihood of collusion. Contrary 
to the previous empirical findings, market growth has been found to have a negative effect on 
the probability of a concerted practice in an industry. Furthermore, our proposition that 
growing demand might attract new entrants, which, in turn, hampers collusion, has been 
falsified in the current context.  
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the Netherlands  3 
 
1.  Introduction 
Even though the benefits of unfettered competition have been well-documented and well-
understood in economic theory, markets in daily life have been characterized by many forms 
of multilateral anti-competitive behaviors known as cartel formation or collusion. For 
instance, a study by Clarke and Evenett (2003) reports that during the 1990s, the European 
Commission and the United States Department of Justice between them prosecuted over 40 
cross-border cartels that involved private firms. If one takes the within-border cartel cases 
and undetected cartels into account, the number is enormous.  
 
More importantly than the number of cartel cases, the damage they give to the economy has 
made economists and policymakers worry about the phenomenon of collusion. A recent study 
by Connor (2004) reveals that the median increase in price resulting from collusion was about 
25 %, which shows how effective these collective agreements among firms are. Similarly, 
Griffin (1989) finds that cartels in his sample charged a 45 % markup over marginal costs on 
average.  
 
Given the enormity of cases, and the welfare transfers they have caused, the detection of 
cartels- which is a longstanding antitrust problem- is highly essential. In this respect, it is 
important for regulatory bodies to develop structural screens to forecast where and under 
which conditions cartels are more likely to be formed, which will help them allocate 
investigative resources where they would be most constructive. According to Harrington 
(2008), this screening process is the first stage of a multi-stage process of the detection of 
cartels, which is followed by verification and prosecution. Basically, the role of screening is 
to identify candidates that are worthy of closer scrutiny for verification  process, which 
requires extensive analysis to distinguish competition and collusion.   4 
 
 
Even though in most antitrust cases, detection process is initiated by complaints from 
competitors and/or buyers, and leniency programs; structural screens that combine economic 
theory with data can also serve as a screening function
1
 
. Indeed, a considerable interest in the 
theory of collusion is reflected in the literature over the past few decades, which may serve as 
a guideline for developing screens. Yet, in spite of the vast theoretical literature on the factors 
facilitating or hampering collusion, empirical studies examining industry characteristics that 
affect the likelihood of observing a collusive practice using direct evidence are sparse. 
When developing such structural screens in which industry characteristics bearing on the 
likelihood of collusion are assessed, the endogeneity of market structure and non-random 
sample problems should be taken into account. This study is the first empirical study on 
industry characteristics bearing on the likelihood of collusion which considers both 
endogeneity and sample selection problems. Since there is not a formal econometric 
procedure to handle both endogeneity and sample selection issues simultaneously, we have 
considered using lagged values of explanatory variables to alleviate the endogeneity problem, 
short of using instrumental variables. Having reviewed the empirical literature on industry 
characteristics bearing on the likelihood of collusion, in order to develop a variant of the 
structural screens mentioned above, the current study examines the impact of several industry 
characteristics on the propensity to collude using a dataset on the existence of collusion 
across Dutch industries during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The final sample employed for 
the econometric analysis of the presence of collusion in this paper contains 112 industries. 
The econometric results, inter alia, suggest that our sample of Dutch concerted practices is 
                                                           
1 The difference between screening and verification is that screening identifies suspicious practice, but does not 
provide final evidence of collusion. 
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non-random in the sense that it only consists of anti-competitive agreements that were subject 
of an antitrust immunity seeking behavior. Our bivariate probit model with sample selection 
indicates that concerted practices are less likely to be seen in service industries relative to 
manufacturing industries. The results also show that it is more likely that firms engaged in 
concerted practices in unconcentrated industries, everything else being equal. The relevant 
explanation for this counter-intuitive finding is that cartels prevailed in unconcentrated 
industries thanks to the trade associations that brought all those firms together to involve in 
restrictive practices. Furthermore, we could not find a non-linear relationship between 
concentration and the presence of collusion. 
 
There is also strong evidence from all the regressions that concerted practices are less likely 
in industries where entry is more possible. Interestingly, our estimation results indicate that 
there is a positive correlation between cartel prevalence and import penetration, which 
implies that import competition did not discipline firm behavior and foreign importers joined 
the cartel paradise in the Netherlands. As to the role of measures of asymmetry on concerted 
practice prevalence, the association between patenting activity and propensity to engage in 
collusion is ambiguous in the current setting, while advertising intensity, as the second 
measure of asymmetry, is associated with increased likelihood of collusion. This second 
counter-intuitive finding of the analysis can be explained by the fact that advertisement costs 
can also serve as entry barriers which increase the likelihood of collusion.  
 
Contrary to the previous empirical findings, market growth has been found to have a negative 
effect on the probability of a concerted practice in an industry. Seemingly, the theoretical 
prediction that collusion is easier to sustain under higher rates of growth has been offset by other 
mechanisms that we cannot observe in the current setting. A possible explanation might be that 
higher demand uncertainties that are arising from fast growth might dominate the effect of growth 6 
 
itself. Furthermore, our proposition that growing demand might attract new entrants, which, in 
turn, hampers collusion, has been falsified in the current context.  
 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents a review of prior empirical 
research on factors that facilitate or hinder collusion. Section 3 explains the institutional 
background and gives the details of data employed in this study. Section 4 introduces the 
econometric model and Section 5 presents the results. Finally Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  A Review of Prior Empirical Research 
Throughout the economic literature there have been various empirical studies examining the 
functioning of cartels. These empirical studies mostly rely on the details published by 
antitrust authorities on uncovered illegal cartels and the records of legal cartels survived in 
the past. For instance, Porter (1983) examines price wars in a railroad cartel in the late 1800s 
in the U.S. Genesove and Mullin (1998) study the American Sugar Industry cartel during the 
late 1800s and early 1900s. Recently, Röller and Steen (2006) have analyzed the Norwegian 
legal cement cartel for the period 1955-1968 to study the effectiveness of the cartel. 
However, for a more comprehensive overview of the workings of cartel, the reader might 
refer to Harrington (2006), in which  details about cartels from about 20 European 
Commission decisions over 1999-2004 are examined, and to Levenstein and Suslow (2006), 
who study 19 case studies of various individual cartels 
 
Apart from the studies focusing on the workings of cartels, another strand of the literature has 
focused on the factors having an impact on cartel stability on an aggregate level. This strand 
of the literature has mainly centered on characteristics influencing cartel duration and cartel 
formation, which are the most common measures of cartel effectiveness, since they are the 7 
 
most easily gauged. As Levenstein and Suslow (2006) put, we would, ideally, like to compare 
the prices and profits that prevailed with what would have occurred absent the cartel. 
Nevertheless, this type of  counterfactual analysis is barely undertaken in the literature. 
Instead, empirical cartel studies have revolved around factors impacting the stability of 
cartels using the information demonstrated in court decrees.  
 
Theoretical foundations of the above-mentioned factors are firmly established in theories of 
collusion. The term “collusion” is basically understood as a cooperative agreement that is 
self-enforcing by nature as these agreements cannot be legally contracted most of the time. 
Thence, thanks to the self-enforcing nature of collusion, repeated interactions (over time and 
across markets) among firms provide the necessary incentives for colluding. Accordingly, 
theoretical scholars have invoked to the theory of repeated games to model the stability of 
collusion.  
 
To illustrate this repeated game setting mathematically, let us consider the following 
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where Π𝐽 is the one-period profit jointly maximized, Π𝑀 is the one-period monopoly profit, 𝑛 
is the number of firms in the industry, and 𝗿 is the discount rate (Tirole, 1988, p. 247-48). 
This condition ensures that the threshold discounted expected future profits net of one-period 
monopoly profit resulting from cheating must be positive so that collusion is sustainable.  
 
As can be seen from the necessary condition stated in equations (1) and (2), to determine 
whether collusion is sustainable, the discount factor 𝗿 is of crucial importance. It actually 
shows how patient firms are. For instance, for impatient firms with a lower discount factor; 
that is, for firms putting a higher weight on current profits relative to expected future profits, 
it is harder to sustain collusion. Conversely, it is easier to sustain collusion for patient firms 
with a higher discount factor; that is, for firms putting a lower weight on current profits 
relative to expected future profits. However, all in all, the overall sustainability of collusion 
hinges on the critical threshold for the discount factor notwithstanding very high or very low 
discount factors firms have. Stated more precisely, the discount factors firms participating in 
a collusive agreement have must exceed the critical threshold for the discount factor in order 
for collusion to be maintained. Consequently, the lower this threshold is, the easier a 
collusion to be kept up.  
 
As expressed by Ivaldi et al. (2003), the determination of this critical threshold provides a 
background for evaluating the extent for collusion. Stated more explicitly, in order to gauge 
the effect of the industry characteristics on the likelihood of collusion, we can eyeball how 
these industry characteristics would have an influence on this critical threshold. While a 9 
 
collusion-hindering factor will raise this critical threshold, a facilitating factor will decrease 
it.  
 
I review below the main characteristics associated with the (in)stability of collusion, chiefly 
by examining how these factors influence the above-mentioned threshold. In doing so, I refer 
to the empirical studies analyzing these factors. For theoretical studies, one can refer to the 
comprehensive review by Feuerstein (2005).  
 
2.1.  Factors Impacting Collusion 
I draw on the classification made by Ivaldi et al. (2003) in identifying the relevant factors 
affecting the sustainability of collusion. First, there are some structural variables that are 
associated with the extent and characteristics of competition such as entry barriers, market 
transparency, and the number of competitors etc. Second, there are factors from the demand 
side that are associated with the evolution of demand in the market: how volatile is the 
market demand? Does the market have future growth prospects? Are there considerable 
business cycles in the market? Third, there are characteristics associated with the supply side, 
which are mostly related to the degree of asymmetry among firms in the market: Is there 
radical innovation in production technologies? Do firms have symmetric structures? To what 
extent does the product differentiation take place?  
 
Based on the classification described in the previous paragraph, this section reviews the 
impact of various industry features that have been identified by previous empirical literature 
to have impact on the stability of collusion.   
 
2.1.1.  Structural Variables 10 
 
The concept of market structure is central to industrial organization literature. It essentially 
stands on the factors that are believed to have an impact on the extent and characteristics of 
competition. Hence, these factors, which can also be entitled as  structural variables, by 
nature, are the factors affecting the sustainability of collusion. Among these structural 
variables, the number of competitors, entry barriers, market transparency, and the degree of 
firms’ interaction are the most noteworthy ones.  
 
In what follows, I review the structural variables that the literature has singled out as being 
pertinent when evaluating the sustainability of collusion within a market. Nonetheless, one 
should bear in mind that these variables are neither necessary nor sufficient for a collusion to 
be maintained, but solely influence the likelihood that collusion is sustained. A final caveat is 
that these structural variables might be endogenous. That is, these characteristics may be the 
outcome of a collusive act by firms in the industry rather than being factors ex-ante affecting 
the likelihood of collusion.  
 
2.1.1.1.  Number of Firms 
The number of competitors in the market is a crucial factor in determining the likelihood of 
collusion. Correspondingly, the concentration measures of the industry such as Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index (HHI) are also important determinants of collusion. In general, a small 
number of firms in the industry, which corresponds to a high-level of concentration, is 
associated with a high probability of collusion. The main reason is that coordination is more 
difficult, the larger the number of participants involved. Accordingly, a large number of 
parties make deviations from the collusive contract harder to track. Furthermore, the larger 
the number of firms involved, the lower a share they get from the jointly-maximized profits, 11 
 
which makes deviations from collusive agreements more attractive and punishments to these 
deviations by other competitors less costly.  
 
Beyond what has been said, the participants can have different views about the optimal price, 
since their cost structures vary and/or their views about demand conditions might diverge. 
Consequently, as Hey and Kelley (1974) puts, the smaller the number of competitors, the less 
likely it is that these differences will appear.  
 
Empirical evidence concerning the impact of the number of firms in the industry or the 
concentration on the likelihood of collusion conforms to the theoretical predictions with few 
exceptions. Hay and Kelley (1974) examined the violations prosecuted by the Antitrust 
Division and found that these cases appear to be in concentrated markets. Asch and Seneca 
(1975) analyzed a sample of 101 large manufacturing corporations- of which 51 are colluders 
and of which 50 are randomly selected non-colluders- for the period 1958-1967 in U.S. They 
concluded that firms in highly concentrated industries characterized by low entry barriers are 
more collusion prone. Likewise, Fraas and Greer (1977) analyzed the formal legal actions of 
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice against illegal (explicit) price fixing 
arrangements. Using non-parametric statistical techniques, they revealed that relatively small 
number of competitors is favorable to the  presence of collusion. Grout and Sonderegger 
(2005) investigated cartel evidence using European Commission cases from 1990 to 2005 and 
the U.S. Department of Justice horizontal price fixing cases from 1994 to 2005, and found 
that concentration in the form of market share of the largest three firms is positively linked to 
cartel formation.  
 12 
 
Contrary to the findings above, Asch and Seneca (1976) and Dick (1996) reported that 
industry concentration is negatively related to incidence of collusion. More specifically, Dick 
(1996) studied legal and privately enforced industry cartels that formed under the Webb-
Pomerene Export Trade Act, and found that cartels are more apt to form in industries that had 
many small firms. However, it should be borne in mind that these so-called Webb-Pomerene 
cartels had been formed to enable groups of small manufacturers to economize on marketing 
costs by coordinating their export marketing activities. An efficiency-driven argument might 
also be at work in a case like this. That is, by colluding and raising prices, less efficient firms 
might be able to survive, resulting in a decline in concentration. As to the study by Asch and 
Seneca (1976), they examined the role of collusion in the profitability of American 
manufacturing corporations that were found guilty of cartel formation during the period 
1958-1967. A possible shortcoming of their study-  and in this regard of some studies 
mentioned above- is that the data originate from antitrust cases and might therefore be subject 
to selection bias. Alternatively, their study might be suffering from omitted variable bias as 
cartels might be prevalent in unconcentrated industries thanks to the coordinating role played 
by trade associations. More importantly, these studies do not address the endogeneity 
problem either. That is, the papers do not take into account the fact that the concentration 
ratio  or the number of firms itself might be endogenous, as they are a function of the 
competitive regime.  
 
Symeonidis’s (2003) study was the first attempt to address this endogeneity problem  by 
running a two-stage Probit model in which the concentration ratios have been replaced by the 
fitted values. His sample includes 151 industries, of which 71 are categorized as “collusive” 
(legal cartels registered under Britain’s 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act) and of which 
80 are classified as “competitive” that are chosen randomly. His main finding is that the 13 
 
likelihood of collusion escalates with concentration but decreases with concentration squared. 
Therefore, this concentration (number of firms)-likelihood of collusion puzzle is said to be 
explained best by Symeonidis’s (2003) finding of a concave relationship between cartel 
presence and concentration, since he takes into both selection and endogeneity issues.  
 
2.1.1.2.  Exclusionary Practices 
Another important factor to have an impact on incidence of collusion is exclusionary 
practices such as entry barriers. Ivaldi et al. (2003) argue that collusion is hard to maintain if 
barriers to entry are low. Typically, any attempt to set prices above the competitive level to 
jointly maximize the profits would attract the potential competitors and thereby trigger entry 
absent entry barriers, which annihilates the profitability of collusion. Moreover, the 
possibility of future entry is associated with toning down the scope for retaliation,  as it 
decreases the potential cost of deviation in terms of relinquished future profits.    
 
Cartels are well aware of the fact that entry will attenuate their attempts to raise profits. 
Dick’s (1996) study of Webb-Pomerene cartels revealed that these cartels were inclined to 
appear in industries characterized by high barriers to entry reflected in large amounts of fixed 
capital requirements. Likewise, Symeonidis (2003) reported a positive impact of capital 
intensity, which was interpreted as a proxy for barrier to entry, on the likelihood of collusion. 
Finally, Grout and Sonderegger (2005) unfolded that traditional entry barriers proxied as 
gross capital expenditure per firm, the level of stocks per firm, and the level of R&D per firm 
have marginal effects on cartel formation. They ascribe this lack of strong entry barrier 
evidence to the fact that their data are based on cartels that have been discovered and 
successfully prosecuted, and hence the data might not include the  cases in which cartel 
members avoided raising entry barriers for the fear of being discovered and prosecuted.  14 
 
 
Nonetheless; as stated by Levenstein and Suslow (2006), one should note that the most 
successful cartels do not basically take barriers to entry as exogenous; they vigorously try to 
create them. Therefore, the endogeneity of barriers to entry should be considered when 
modeling their impact on the likelihood of collusion. 
 
2.1.1.3.  Interaction Frequency among Firms 
The conventional wisdom about the impact of frequency of interaction among firms on the 
likelihood of collusion puts that the more frequently firms interact, the more easily collusion 
will be expedited, as firms can react more swiftly to a deviation by any of them. That is, by 
reducing the reaction time to deviations from the collusive agreement, increased interaction 
frequency among firms facilitate collusion. Should the flock of time that must pass by before 
any deviation could be punished be long, the payoffs from deviation can be enjoyed longer, 
which makes deviation more tempting. Besides, a longer reaction time shifts possible 
retaliations further in the future, which makes punishment less daunting, since firms discount 
the future.  
 
Empirically, it is almost impossible to keep track of interactions among cartel members. 
Nevertheless, interaction frequencies among firms can most officially and at best be proxied 
by a variety of regimental and disciplinary arrangements such as trade associations, single 
sales agencies etc. For example, by engaging in the collection and dissemination of 
information, industry associations often create an environment where firms are able to 
interact easily and frequently, which may abet collusion. However, empirical studies 
examining the effect of these on cartel formation have been scarce throughout the literature. 
For instance, Hey and Kelley (1974) documented that trade associations are positively 15 
 
associated with incidence of collusion. Unequivocally, these arrangements can also be seen as 
devices to monitor behaviors of each cartel participants. However, in most general terms, this 
type of arrangements can be employed to proxy interaction frequencies. 
 
Another marginal way to gauge the frequency of interaction among firms is to check how 
spatially they are encountered. By increasing the frequency of interaction between the firms, 
multi-market contact can promote collusion. Besides, Ivaldi et al. (2003) point out that by 
alleviating asymmetries that appear in individual markets, multi-market contact might enable 
firms to maintain collusion in markets where the industry characteristics alone would not 
allow such collusion. For instance, one firm might possess a competitive advantage in one 
market and its competitor might have its own competitive advantage in another market. Then, 
multi-market contact leads to an overall symmetry that expedites collusion even though a 
market-level approach might imply that collusion is hard to maintain. Unfortunately, 
empirical papers studying the impact of multi-market contact on collusion has been sparse, 
too. Being the only empirical work examining this relationship, Hey and Kelley (1974) 
reported that industries that are determined to be colluding in one local market are repeatedly 
to be found colluding in other local markets.  
 
2.1.1.4.  A History of Cartel Activity 
Whether an industry has had a history of cartelization might be a relevant factor in assessing 
the likelihood of collusion. As stated by Dick (1996), should particular industries be 
structurally leaned towards cartelization, their past behavior should be a tenable predictor of 
their current and future behavior. Some earlier empirical research provides evidence for this 
proposition. Hey and Kelley (1974) concluded that industries colluding at one point in time 
often can be found to be colluding at later points in time. The upholding evidence by Suslow 16 
 
(1988) and Marquez (1994) revealed that between 36 % and 64 % of international commodity 
cartels made multiple attempts at fixing price. On the other hand, Dick (1996) found only 19 
out of the 125 so-called Webb-Pomerene cartels made repeated attempts to form a cartel 
agreement. The overall conclusion of the study was that cartel formation was consistently 
unrelated to the industry’s cartel history. A relevant explanation for this finding is that most 
of the collapses in cartel agreements aroused from enforcement problems that could not be 
resolved. Alternatively, cartels might have been abrogated forever just after they achieved 
their initial goals. In such cases, cartels are less likely to be formed in industries characterized 
by a history of cartelization. 
 
Contrarily, a history of cartel activity in a certain industry might indicate the presence of a 
“culture of collusion” among firms in that industry, which promotes coordination. More 
interestingly, any prior attempt to form a cartel might help firms “learn” identifying a 
collusive equilibrium and coordinate on it. As stated more explicitly by Levenstein and 
Suslow (2006), what cartels can learn is how to monitor output and prices of individual cartel 
participants to detect cheating, how to configure incentives so that collusion is more 
preferable to cheating in the long run, how to impose punishments in response to cheating, 
and, how to design exclusionary practices to deter entry by nonparticipants.   
 
In sum, there is not a clear-cut answer to the question of whether an industry has had a 
history of cartelization has a positive or negative impact on the likelihood of collusion.   
 
2.1.2.  Demand Side Variables 
By and large, demand side variables are considered as factors associated with the evolution of 
demand in the market. Is the market demand growing, stagnating, or declining? Are there 17 
 
substantial fluctuations in the market demand? By changing the level of expected future 
profits, and thereby the patience firms have, these variables can have influence on collusion 
formation either in a positive or negative way. Finally, the structure of the demanders in the 
market can also have an impact on the likelihood of collusion by changing the level of cartel 
enforcement costs. In what follows, I recapitulate the demand side variables associated with 
the likelihood of collusion.   
 
2.1.2.1.  Demand Growth 
It is widely acknowledged that collusion is easier to maintain when short-term gains from 
cheating are relatively little in comparison to the cost of future retaliation. Naturally, this 
suggests that collusion is easier to sustain in growing markets in which discounted future 
profits to be enjoyed are larger relative to today’s profits. Contrariwise, collusion is more 
difficult to sustain in markets characterized by declining demand, which implies that future 
profits are smaller compared to todays notwithstanding retaliation. However, this type of 
reasoning is invalid in the absence of a fixed number of market players. Stated more literally, 
growing demand might attract new entrants, which hampers collusion as explained in the 
subsection of “Exclusionary Practices” above. Ivaldi et al. (2003) argue that it is convenient 
to disengage the intrinsic impact of demand growth from the impact of entry and other 
factors, in order to evaluate the contribution of market demand growth to likelihood of 
collusion. In markets where entry barriers are low, demand growth invites entry, and the 
ultimate effect will be that it will thwart collusion. Oppositely, in markets characterized by 
high entry barriers, demand growth might facilitate collusion. Alternatively, a high level of 
demand growth might also be germane to higher demand uncertainty and, therefore, 
destabilize collusion, which will be discussed in the next sub-section. 
 18 
 
The corollary evidence on the impact of demand growth on cartel formation is that growth 
has a positive impact on the likelihood of collusion. Dick (1996) reported that doubling the 
rate of demand growth raised cartel formation probability by 1 %. Along similar lines, Grout 
and Sonderegger (2005) found that growth in demand has an extremely robust positive effect 
on cartel formation. However, the conundrum is perhaps best explained by Symeonidis 
(2003). His results provided evidence of an inverted-U relationship between demand growth 
and the likelihood of collusion
2
 
. He concluded that while a moderate growth rate is more 
favorable for stable collusion than a stagnant or declining demand, fast growth hampers 
collusion. All in all, each of the mechanisms described in the previous paragraph would lead 
to a non-monotonic relationship between demand growth and incidence of collusion. That is, 
the impact of demand growth on collusion will be positive for some positive values below a 
certain level while it will be negative for high levels of demand growth.   
2.1.2.2.  Business Cycles and Demand Fluctuations 
As formally captured by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Haltiwanger and Harrington 
(1991), and extended further by Bagwell and Staiger (1997), collusion is less sustainable in 
markets characterized by demand fluctuations. The underlying argument is that when the 
market is at a peak, short-term gains from cheating are greatest while the cost of retaliation is 
minimal. Consequently, collusion is more difficult to sustain during those times.  
 
The empirical evidence on the above-mentioned corollary of the impact of demand 
fluctuations on collusion is mixed though. Gallet and Schroeter (1995) studied the U.S. rayon 
industry during the 1930s and tested the effects of demand volatility and expected future 
industry profits on collusion. They found that the degree of coordination fell when demand 
                                                           
2 The coefficients of growth and growth-squared are positive and negative, respectively.  19 
 
was high and when the expectation of future profits was lower. Likewise, Gallet (1997) 
studied the effects of market demand and import supply on the degree of oligopoly 
coordination in the U.S. steel industry since 1950. His results showed that coordination was 
weakest during periods of high market demand meaning that collusion among U.S. steel 
producers was countercyclical. On the other hand, Dick (1996) reported that cartel formation 
was unrelated to business cycle timing.  
 
2.1.2.3.  Buyer Concentration 
It should be clear that powerful buyers make collusion harder to sustain owing to the fact that 
buyers might take advantage of price wars between cartel members. In an attempt to do so, 
buyers will use their power strategically, so as to vitiate any collusive agreement that might 
prevail among suppliers in the market. What is more, from cartel participants’ perspective, 
cartel enforcement costs will be much higher when buyers are numerous and spread 
geographically. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence regarding the impact of buyer 
concentration on cartel formation is both scarce and unconvincing. Being the only empirical 
work examining this relationship, Dick (1996) found that cartel formation was unrelated to 
concentration among buyers.   
 
2.1.3.  Supply Side Variables 
Among factors facilitating collusion, supply side variables loom large. These characteristics 
are mostly related to the extent of asymmetry among firms in the market. Do firms have 
similar cost structures and production facilities? Do firms supply similar products, or is there 
considerable product differentiation? What is the level of innovation and technology in the 
market? By altering the discount factors,δ , firms have, which is a gauge of the asymmetry 
among firms, the answers to these questions will clearly have an impact on the likelihood of 20 
 
collusion. For instance, by investing in a superior technology, a firm might be able to reduce 
its costs, and thereby sell its products at a lower price, which may destroy the incentives for 
that firm to collude.  
 
I review below the supply side variables of which impact on the likelihood of collusion have 
been studied throughout the empirical literature.   
 
2.1.3.1.  Cost Asymmetries and Quality Differences 
Collusion is more difficult to sustain under cost asymmetries and quality differences of the 
products sold by different firms, as low cost and/or high quality firms are more difficult to 
discipline in this asymmetric setting. The reason comes from the fact that there is less room 
for the rival high-cost and/or low quality firms to trigger a price war. Among the factors 
affecting cost asymmetries and (perceived) quality differences, innovation and vertical 
differentiation are the most predominant ones. 
 
2.1.3.2.  Innovativeness 
Innovativeness of an industry is expected to be of crucial importance in determining the 
likelihood of collusion in a market, since innovation fosters asymmetries in costs and/or 
qualities. As a result, collusion is less likely to be expected to occur in innovative markets. 
The empirical evidence accurately predicts this relationship despite being not strong.  
 
Symeonidis (1999) studied U.K. manufacturing industries in the mid 1950s and found that 
there is a negative link between collusive pricing and R&D intensity, which is considered to 
be a proxy for innovativeness, even though the relationship is not very strong. Similarly, in 
his subsequent study of legal cartels registered under Britain’s 1956 Restrictive Trade 21 
 
Practices Act, Symeonidis (2003) found that there is a weak link between R&D intensity and 
collusion. Overall, the empirical evidence is in line with theoretical predictions in spite of 
being weak.  
 
2.1.3.3.  Vertical Differentiation 
As previously mentioned, collusion is more difficult to sustain under (perceived) quality 
differences of the products sold by different firms, as high quality firms are more difficult to 
discipline in this asymmetric setting. In an attempt to offer better products and/or increase the 
quality differences between their products and their rivals’ products, these high quality firms 
vertically differentiate their products. Empirically, advertising can be seen as a proxy to 
account for this vertical differentiation.  
 
The empirical evidence on the impact of advertising on collusion is strong and convincing. 
Asch and Seneca (1975) found that the colluders are centered in industries characterized by 
low advertising intensity. Along similar lines, Symeonidis (1999) reported strong evidence 
that collusive pricing was much less common in advertising-intensive industries compared to 
industries without substantial advertising. Finally, Symeonidis (2003) revealed that incidence 
of price collusion is lower in advertising-intensive industries.  
 
Alternatively, a related predisposition of a market to effective collusion is the level of product 
homogeneity. Hey and Kelley (1974) unfolded that conspiracy among competitors were most 
likely to occur when the product is homogenous. Similarly, Asch and Seneca’s (1976) 
findings support the hypothesis that collusion is more likely to occur in the relatively 
homogeneous producer goods firms. In accordance with these results, in his analysis of 
Webb-Pomerene cartels, Dick (1996) found that differentiated products were 7.8% less likely 22 
 
to be imported through a cartel, and durable products manufacturing industries, which were 
characterized by product heterogeneity, were 3.9% less likely to be cartelized.  
 
In sum, there is a strong negative relationship between the degree of vertical integration and 
collusion, which has extensively been documented throughout the empirical literature.  
 
3.  The Enforcement of Dutch Antitrust Policy during the Last Two Decades 
Netherlands’ competition policy has evolved considerably over the past two decades. The old 
Economic Competition Act of 1956 (WEM: Wet Economische Mededinging), which was 
based on the so-called “abuse system”, was replaced by the new Competition Act 
(Mededingingswet), which was based on “prohibition system”.  Concurrently, the new 
enforcement agency, the Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa) was established in 
1998. There have been several amendments in the Competition Act since then. The 
Competition Act was first amended in accordance with the European Competition Law in 
2004 as a result of European Regulation 1/2003. Another amendment took place on July 1st, 
2005, when the NMa was given the status of Autonomous Administrative Authority. Finally, 
as of October 1st, 2007, the NMa has been awarded additional powers, as a result of the 
evaluation of the Competition Act. 
 
Under the former Economic Competition Act, the enforcer, which was the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (MEA), had to plead in each case that a behavior or agreement infringed 
the law. The MEA, as the enforcer, had the burden of proof, which is reversed under the new 
prohibition system, so that the firm should show that practices or agreements associated with 
the law’s prohibitions are in conformity with the standard. Furthermore, the old Economic 
Competition Act’s main touchstone was simply the “general interest”, a concept lacking in 23 
 
context or guidance for decisions. Firms with a restrictive agreement that was not against the 
“general interest” had to inform the MEA, which consequently registered the agreement in 
the Dutch “Kartel Register”. Deciding whether behavior was against the general interest or 
not required deliberation with other ministries, which were mostly concerned about other 
aspects of the general interest rather than competition policy. In a report by OECD (1998), it 
is stated that every case could turn out to be an opportunity for fundamental debate about the 
relative ascendancy of competition policy, and for many years competition policy 
undoubtedly lost. Accordingly, those choices about aspects of general interest led to the lax 
enforcement of the old Economic Competition Act. 
 
Generally speaking, the lax enforcement of the previous competition law resulted in tolerance 
towards collusive business behavior in the Netherlands, which, in turn, increased the 
reputation of the Netherlands as “cartel paradise”. The government’s confidential register of 
cartels included 245 agreements to divide markets, around 270 agreements to fix prices, 
together with around 50 exclusive dealing agreements and more than 200 agreements to 
control competition in distribution (OECD, 1993, p. 60). The resilience of these restrictive 
agreements can be seen from details that the MEA (1989) released in 1989 on 109 horizontal 
price agreements active in September 1988. 40 per cent of these agreements had survived for 
more than twenty years and a further 20 per cent had already celebrated their tenth 
anniversary (Asbeek- Brusse and Griffiths, 1998, p. 24). As to the scale of these agreements, 
77 % of them were at national level, while the remaining 23 % were operating locally. 
Strikingly, the majority of these agreements consisted of multiple provisions, as can be seen 
from Table I. 
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In 1992, the MEA (1992) released details on the 201 market sharing agreements that were 
registered in existence in September 1991. In comparison to the previously mentioned 
horizontal price agreements, these were relatively younger. Only 14 per cent had been kept 
on the records for more than two decades and another 17 per cent had been on the register for 
more than ten years (Asbeek- Brusse and Griffiths, 1998, p. 25). Even within the general 
description of “market sharing”, 94 % of these agreements involved other forms of restrictive 
practices. 
 
More dramatically, as reported by de Jong (1990), 21 of the total 55 incidences of serious 
restrictions to competition of a predominantly national character that have been the subject of 
an Order under Article 85(1) EEC Treaty during 1970-1989 (almost 40 % of the cases) 
involved the Netherlands.  
 
Having shown that the Netherlands was a cartel paradise under the former Economic 
Competition Act, we can discuss more detailed explanations for the failure of the prosecution 
of restrictive practices. Indeed, most of the explanation lies within the nature of the 
legislation itself. First of all, the old Economic Competition Act postulated that cartels are not 
deleterious, unless the government showed the contrary, which left the burden of proof to the 
government. Second, the term “general interest”, a concept lacking in context or guidance for 
decisions, was not specified within the Act, which left the MEA a large margin of judgment. 
Finally, even though there was a cartel register,  the Act did not propose provisions for 
busting unregistered cartels or for sanctions against non-registration. Consequently, the 
agreements kept under the register represented an incomplete depiction of cartels.  
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To summarize, the competition policy under the former Economic Competition Act was 
completely reactive. As other aspects of the general interest included macro-economic policy 
objectives in the form of price controls, or its industrialization and regional policies, or 
industrial subsidies supporting sectors during the first oil crisis, competition policy could not 
find much space to itself. Furthermore, as discussed by Asbeek- Brusse and Griffiths (1998), 
the conflicts were resolved within the deliberations between governmental officials and 
business representatives. More often than not, officials at the MEA worked concomitantly 
with business representatives. This intimacy resulted in a gentle stance towards collusive 
business behavior.  
 
Given that the local legislative climate posed little threat to collusive business behavior, one 
might raise the question of whether trade dependence of the Dutch economy had an impact of 
a disciplining act on concerted practices. The answer of that question lies in the fact that 
three-fourths of Dutch consumers’ purchases were domestic. Industries such as construction, 
utilities, financial transactions, transport, retail trade, and consumer and professional services, 
which constitute much of the economy, were isolated from imports. More importantly, since 
the market was small, competition in some of these sectors that are characterized economies 
of scale took place among a relatively small number of suppliers (OECD, 1998, p. 7).  
 
As a second potential threat to collusive business behavior in the Netherlands, given the lax 
enforcement of the domestic competition law, one might also consider the involvement of 
European Commission (EC) and the European Competition Law. Indeed, the fact that the 
Dutch were among the last to have legislation that did not ban concerted practices utterly 
meant that Dutch cartels were under close scrutiny by the EC to a greater extent. The early 
impact of the EC competition law was on the behavior of firms rather than the enforcement of 26 
 
the domestic competition law. For instance, while there were 125 registered collective 
exclusive dealing agreements in 1963, there were only 45 agreements registered in 1978 
(Mok, 1978, p. 743-744). Part of this decrease might be ascribed to the closer scrutiny by the 
EC into Dutch cartels. This closer scrutiny had started in 1971, when the first EC decision 
conveying that a cartel among Dutch firms (the Dutch Cement Dealers’ Association) had 
violated Article 81 TEC came
3,4, and it reached its peak in 1977, when the EC banned the 
system of collective exclusive dealing among Dutch bicycle dealers
5, even though it had been 
allowed after some adjustments under the former Economic Competition Act. More 
dramatically, in 1992, the EC decided that the Dutch construction cartel, which was a purely 




. This decision was later ratified by the European Court of First Instance. In 
addition to that the EC initiated a procedure against the Dutch government based on Article 
226 TEC. More precisely, it argued that the Dutch competition law and administrative 
practices, inter alia the industry’s agreements, impeded the proper functioning of the 
European competition rules (Drahos, 2001, p. 213).   
The Dutch government’s initial reaction was to invigorate the anti-cartel policy within the 
existing framework. Aside from a more active policy of handling cartel complaints, this 
included a sequence of general prohibitions on horizontal price agreements (effective from 
July 1993) and, on market sharing agreements and collusive tendering agreements (effective 
from June 1994). However, given the inapplicability of these early prohibitions due to the 
                                                           
3 Decision of 16 December 1971, JO 1972  L13/34 
4 Case 8/72  
5 Centraal Bureau voor de Rijwielhandel, OJ 1978 L20/18 
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nature of the former “abuse system”; a new Competition Act (Mededingingswet), which was 
based on “prohibition system”, was launched in 1998, accompanied by the establishment of 
the new enforcement agency (NMa).  
 
Article 6 of the new Competition Act conforms to Article 101 TFEU (ex Article 81 TEC and 
ex Article 85 EEC Treaty) in its prohibition of all kinds of anti-competitive agreements. As to 
exemptions, the Dutch competition law subsumes all of the EU block exemptions for general 
types of agreements, exemptions for specific sectors, and exemptions for specific 
agreements.
7 This incorporation is dynamic in the sense that the Dutch law incorporates not 




Furthermore, the new Competition Act allowed undertakings to apply for dispensation for 
agreements that were already in existence and that had begun in the era of “cartel paradise”. 
More specifically, firms were allowed to request exemption from Article 6 Mw via Article 17 
Mw (which has been repealed later) of the Competition Act. However, one should note that 
not every anti-competitive practice would get antitrust-immunity. To be more specific, in 
Article 17 Mw it was stated: “The director general may grant an exemption from the 
prohibition of Article 6(1) Mw for agreements, decisions or concerted practices, within the 
meaning of that Article, which contribute to improving the production or distribution or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit, and which do not: (a) impose any restrictions on the undertakings 
concerned, ones that are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, or (b) afford 
such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of 
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the products and services in question.” Thus, Article 17 Mw specified that undertakings 
would be exempted from Article 6 Mw if said agreements, decisions or conduct improved 
production/distribution or stimulated economic or technical progress, and, if a reasonable 
portion of the benefits accrued to consumers. In return for applying for an exemption, firms 
were obliged to provide data on several features of the planned cooperation: the number of 
firms involved, the duration of agreements, the total sales of all firms involved in cooperative 
agreement etc. The reaction was that the NMa was swarmed with dispensation requests – 
1,100 at the deadline. Most of the agreements for which exemption is sought took place in 
health care industry, as a result of caution for agreements that would not be prohibited, and in 
construction industry, which was characterized by a long history of cartelization. The 
assessment of these exemption requests by the NMa literally took years (until 2004). Based 
on assessments, the NMa (i) rejected the request, as the agreement is not anti-competitive, or (ii) 
dispensation was granted for some other requests, even though the agreements were 
anticompetitive by nature, or (iii) dispensation was granted after altering or reformulating the 
initial agreements by the firms involved, or (iv) reached the decision that the Competition Act 
is not applicable.  
 
Referring to the NMa’s verdicts on dispensation applications, of these dispensation requests, 
47 % did not violate any of the new competition rules, whereas of the other 53 %, only 9 % 
were granted as dispensations by the NMa.  
 
There were several different motives of parties to apply for dispensation. For some of them, 
the main motivation was legal certainty as in the case of health care industry. Firms wanted to 
avoid the blackbox about competition issues, since there had been drastic changes in the 
competition law and its enforcement, which left most of the companies hesitant about their 29 
 
agreements with other undertakings. Even though general prohibitions on horizontal price 
agreements and, on market sharing agreements and collusive tendering agreements became 
effective as of July 1993, and of June 1994, respectively; there were not many prosecutions 
during the period of 1993-1998 (the period between the early prohibitions and the change in 
the competition law).  
 
However, the motivation for firms with anti-competitive agreements was different. At the 
time of the change in the law, there were some “cartels” with large amounts of investments 
facing overcapacity problems. The members of those “cartels” wanted to divide overcapacity, 




At this point, one might argue that hardcore cartels were not included in the subsample of the 
dispensations requests with anti-competitive agreements. That is, “dirty” cartels should not be 
expected to be on the original list in the first place, since one cannot expect cartels to be 
reported in 1998, as they had already been declared illegal in 1994. This view is partially 
correct, as there were very few price-fixing cases in these dispensation requests. Yet, the 
remaining dispensation requests with anti-competitive agreements include market sharing, 
bid rigging (which has always been a problem in the Netherlands, and not been seen as anti-
competitive), joint production  agencies (e.g. asphalt production) etc, which are notable 
violations of the competition law. Actually, these are typical Dutch cartels operating at 
national or local level. Besides, one should remember that even though there were general 
prohibitions under the former competition act, these provisions were laxly applicable and the 
enforcement was very weak in the sense that there were very few prosecutions during the 
period of 1993-1998. Nonetheless, the data generating process for our sample of multilateral 
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anti-competitive practices is a bit different than the data generating process for an authority 
busting cartels or the data generating process for leniency applications.  
 
4.  Linking the Dutch Competition Authority’s Decisions to Industry 
Characteristics in a Binary Probit Model with Sample Selection: Data and Empirical 
Specifications 
 
4.1  Data Sources 
We use different sources of data for the current analysis. These are Dispensation Requests 
Database, Production Survey (PS) and Community Innovation Survey (CIS).  Below, we 
concisely describe these main sources of data in more detail. 
 
Dispensation Requests Database 
This database consists of original dispensation requests from the NMa achieves. This 
database is confidential and is not publicly available to researchers. The database includes the 
names of companies with an agreement, the code of the industry in which they were 
operating at the time of application (SBI
10
 
 codes), the number of companies in an agreement, 
the total annual revenues of the companies involved in an agreement, and the duration of 
agreement.  
In total, there are around 1,100 dispensation applications. For the minority of the dispensation 
applications for which the competition law was relevant, immunity was granted. More 
specifically, 37 concerted practices in various industries were exempted from the competition 
law. There is not a clear pattern for these industries that had antitrust immunity. As to the 
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length of the antitrust immunity, the average time period during which these multilateral 
restrictive practices were exempted from competition law was 5.39 years. 
 
Referring back  to the NMa’s verdicts on dispensation applications, of these dispensation 
requests, 53 % had violated the Competition Act. For these agreements dispensation was 
either granted even though the agreements were anticompetitive by nature, or dispensation 
was granted after altering or reformulating the initial agreements by the firms involved. Thus, 
we know about the existence of collusion in an industry conditional on exemption 
application, and thence can specify our dependent variable as a binary variable taking value 1 
for “collusive” industries, and 0 for non-collusive industries based on NMa’s decisions. One 
can promptly raise the famous problem of sample selection. We will consider this problem, 
other econometric issues and possible objections in detail in the next section.  
 
Besides, the data set can also be enriched, as the beginning dates of the collusive agreements 
are known from exemption requests. For instance, if NMa did not grant an exemption for a 
specific industry in 2001, and if the beginning of the cooperative agreement was in 1998, 
then it can be inferred that the industry was characterized as being collusive in 1999 and 2000 
as well. The implied assumption here is that the nature of the collusive act was constant 
throughout the agreement and that the cartel did not break up during that period. 
 
PS 
Production Survey (PS) is conducted by the Dutch Bureau of Statistics (CBS) on a yearly 
basis. Data from PS is available for the period between 1993 and 2006.
11
                                                           
11 Data for the industries transport and telecom only covers the period 2000-2006. 
 The PS is a sampled 
survey; only firms with more than 20 employees are included in the sample each year. For 32 
 
smaller firms, sampling fractions decrease, and consequently smallest firms will have gaps in 
the data for several years. Moreover, Statistics Netherlands apply a rotating sample method to 




Data on innovation activities has been collected from the Dutch section of Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS). CIS is a European harmonized questionnaire, held every two years, 
containing questions about innovative activities in companies. Our innovation data covers the 
period 1996-2006. In fact, we use six consecutive CIS-surveys: i.e. CIS2 for 1994-1996, 
CIS2, 5 for 1996-1998, CIS3 for 1998-2000, CIS3, 5 for 2000-2002, CIS4 for 2002-2004, 
and CIS2005 for 2004-2006. Moreover, firms with less than ten employees are not included 
in CIS. 
 
<INSERT TABLE II HERE> 
 
Yet, there are some shortcomings that limit the options for research. For instance, CIS 
contains industries that are not present in PS and vice versa. This reduces the number of 
industries that can be examined. Second, CIS suffers from lower response rates and the 
responses can be selective as it is most likely that innovative firms are more inclined to 
respond than firms that do not innovate. Moreover, since we do not have CIS data in odd 
years, we interpolate the innovation data. Finally, CIS does not capture all aspects of 
innovation. For example, information on human capital formation is not included in CIS.  
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Taking the caveats of our sources for granted, after aggregating firm level data to industry 
level data, we merged the two data sources at the 3 (and sometimes 4) digit SIC-code. Having 
juxtaposed the datasets provided by the CBS and the NMa, we have obtained a sample of 225 
observations. However, as there are missing variables for some of the observations in the 
CBS dataset, the numbers of observations for various covariates are incomplete and different 
from each other. Subsequently, the final sample employed for the econometric analysis of the 
impact of several industry characteristics on the propensity to collude contains 112 industries. 
 
4.2  Empirical Strategy and Variables 
Before we proceed with the estimation strategy we will first discuss the potential problems in 
the dataset and the econometric setting. Firstly, as mentioned previously, one might object to 
the construction of dataset by arguing that hardcore cartels were not included in the 
subsample of the dispensations requests with anti-competitive agreements. That is, “dirty” 
cartels should not be expected to be on the original list in the first place, since one cannot 
expect cartels to be reported in 1998, as they had already been declared illegal in 1994. This 
view is partially correct, as there were very few price-fixing cases in these dispensation 
requests. Yet, the remaining dispensation requests with anti-competitive agreements include 
market sharing, bid rigging (which has always been a problem in the Netherlands, and not 
been seen as anti-competitive), joint production agencies (e.g. asphalt production) etc, which 
are notable violations of the competition law. Actually, these are typical Dutch cartels 
operating at national or local level. Besides, one should remember that even though there 
were general prohibitions under the former competition act, these provisions were laxly 
applicable and the enforcement was very weak in the sense that there were very few 
prosecutions during the period of 1993-1998.  Yet,  we should acknowledge that the data 
generating process for our sample of multilateral anti-competitive practices is a bit different 34 
 
than the data generating process for an authority busting cartels or the data generating process 
for leniency applications.  
 
The second objection is that these Dutch “cartels” are related to explicit collusion, but not to 
tacit collusion. Might it be the case that some of the industries characterized as being non-
collusive were actually engaged in tacit collusion? The answer is “they might have”, and 
unfortunately there is no second source or whatsoever to validate this.  
 
Thirdly, as a newly-established reputation-builder, the NMa might have over-reported and 
erred on the side of classifying non-serious coordination mechanisms as cartels. Translated 
into the econometrics language, this means that the NMa misclassified agreements in the 
dispensation requests, which might result in momentous measurement error in the dependent 
variable, and jeopardize the reliability of the inferences. Again, there is no validation data to 
cross-check the classification. We are dependent on the NMa’s verdicts on agreements.   
 
Fourthly, it is recognized that these concerted practices or “cartels” are located in industries 
of which exogenous characteristics make collusion easier to maintain. Yet, it is also 
acknowledged that collusive agreements among firms have impact on industry structure (see 
for instance Symeonidis (2002)). That is, these characteristics may be the outcome of 
collusive acts by firms in the industry rather than  being factors ex-ante  affecting the 
likelihood of collusion.  Thus, the industry features might be endogenous with respect to 
cartel presence. In order to alleviate this endogeneity problem, we will use predetermined 
lagged values of industry characteristics as explanatory variables.  
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Last but not the least; sample selection might be a huge problem in the current context, since 
non-application by firms for an exemption might result in significant bias in the present data. 
Stated differently, we only know about anti-competitive multilateral agreements conditional 
on dispensation applications. There are other cartels that continued to operate silently 
elsewhere without awareness and surveillance of the NMa. Arguably, our sample is not 
random in the sense that it only consists of anti-competitive agreements that were subject of 
an antitrust immunity seeking behavior. Thus, concerning the estimation technique, we have 
considered using Probit model with sample selection developed by van de Ven and van Pragg 
(1981). This model assumes that there is an underlying relationship in the form of 
 
𝑦𝑗
∗ = 𝑋𝑗𝗽 + 𝜀1𝑗  
[Latent equation] [3] 
 
such that we are able to observe only the binary outcome, which is the presence of 




∗ > 0� 
[Probit equation] [4] 
 
Nonetheless, the dependent variable is not always observed. Instead, the dependent 
variable for observation 𝑗 is observed only if  
𝑦𝑗
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 = �𝑍𝑗𝗾 + 𝜀2𝑗 > 0� 
[Selection equation] [5] 
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where 𝜀1 and 𝜀2 are standard normally distributed (i.e. 𝜀1~𝑁(0,1) and 𝜀2~𝑁(0,1)) and 
corr(𝜀1,𝜀2) = 𝜌. When 𝜌 ≠ 0, standard Probit techniques applied to the Probit equation 
results in biased estimates. However, the Probit model with sample selection yields 
consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates for all the parameters in this class of 
models. Furthermore, for the model to be identified, the selection equation should have 
at least one variable that is not in the Probit equation, which has been ensured in our 
case. 
 
The log-likelihood function is defined as 
 
















where 𝑆 is the set of observations for which 𝑦𝑗 is observed,  offset denotes for the 
variables of which coefficient is constrained to 1, Φ2(.) Is the cumulative bivariate 
normal distribution function (with mean [0 0]′), Φ(.)is the standard cumulative normal, 
and 𝑤𝑗 is an optional weight for observation 𝑗. 
 
In the maximum likelihood estimation of this model, ρ  is not straightforwardly 









�   
[7] 
 
Descriptive statistics for the whole sample, as well as separately for service and 
manufacturing industries are presented in Table II. As previously noted, the empirical model 
we will use is a Probit model with sample selection with the following specification: 
 
 
𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁 𝑗 = 𝗼𝑗 + 𝗽1𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝗽2𝑙𝑎𝑔_ℎℎ𝑖 + 𝗽3𝑙𝑎𝑔_ℎℎ𝑖_2 + 𝗽4𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒
+ 𝗽5𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝗽6𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝗽7𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝗽8𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝗽9𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝗽10𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑋 𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸 + 𝜀1𝑗 
[8] [Probit Equation] 
 
 
𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 𝑗 = 𝗾𝑗 + 𝗾1𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝗾2ℎℎ𝑖 + 𝗾3𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝗾4𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝗾5𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 
+𝗾6𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝗾7𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝗾8𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝗾9𝑐𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑗 
[9] [Selection Equation] 
 
In the present study, collusive behavior is modeled by the existence of a concerted practice in 
a given industry, which is a binary variable. We observe whether there is an anti-competitive 
concerted practice in an industry only if the parties involved applied for a dispensation. Thus, 
the dependent variable, 𝑦𝑗
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡, is the presence of a concerted practice (collusion). On the 
other hand, when choosing our explanatory variables, we pick up variables of which impact 38 
 
on collusion is documented in theoretical studies and former empirical papers. The set of 
regressors 𝑋  for the Probit equation, the industry characteristics, includes, first  of all, 
structural variables. To begin with, service is a dummy variable which is equal to one for 
service industries, and zero for manufacturing industries. The concentration measure used is 
Hirshman-Herfindahl Index (lag_hhi). As mentioned in the review  of prior empirical 
research, the concentration measures of the industry important determinants of collusion. 
Nevertheless, one might argue that if competition is region-wide instead of nation-wide, 
lag_hhi might be a poor measure for market structure. I made an effort to identify such cases 
and excluded a few observations from the sample
12
  
. Furthermore, in order to see if there is a 
non-linear relationship between cartel prevalence and concentration as in Symeonidis (2003), 
we have  also used HHI squared (lag_hhi_2).  Elsewhere industry averages of the binary 
variables indicating if firms use trade associations as information resources (lag_infotrade) are 
also included in the analysis to check if those institutions facilitated concerted practices. Our 
hypothesis is that by engaging in the collection and dissemination of information, industry 
associations often create an environment where firms are able to interact easily and frequently, 
which may abet collusion. Besides, in order to proxy import competition, we have included 
lag_import, the shares of total imports in total sales in a given industry, to examine if foreign 
competition disciplined firms and disrupted their collusive behaviors.  Finally,  we have 
included the ratio of the new entrant firms to all the firms in the industry (lag_entry) as a 
proxy for entry barriers, in order to verify the hypothesis maintaining that collusion is harder 
to maintain if barriers to entry are low. 
                                                           
12 Those excluded industries include Restaurants, Hospital Activities, Veterinary Activities, Taxi Operation etc, 
for which competition operates at regional level. 39 
 
The second set of regressors includes supply side variables. It is intuitive to think that asymmetry 
deters collective behavior: for example, firms that are in a similar position would find it easier to 
reach an agreement which suits all of them. Thus, we have included measures of asymmetry to 
check if these have an impact on the presence of collusion. The first asymmetry measure is 
advertising intensity (lag_advertising), which is defined at the industry level as  advertising 
expenditures divided by total sales. Empirically, advertising can also be seen as a proxy to 
account for vertical differentiation, under which collusion is more difficult to sustain, since high 
quality firms are more difficult to discipline in  this asymmetric setting. Alternatively, 
advertisement costs can create entry barriers as proposed by Sutton (1991), since, for example, 
high advertisement expenditures may signal to potential entrants that they need huge amounts of 
advertisement to promote their products. Nevertheless, high advertisement expenses can also be 
an indicator of tough levels of competition in an industry. Companies try to make their products 
known to people and to promote their features via advertising, so consumers will prefer their 
products  over the products of their competitors.  Our analysis will show the final role of 
advertising on collusion prevalence. On the other hand, as a measure of innovative output that is 
another measure of asymmetry, we have included the ratio of firms with at least one patent 
application (lag_patent). We would expect that the probability of collusion decreases with this 
variable, since innovation fosters asymmetries in costs and/or qualities, which, in turn, makes 
collusion more difficult.  
 
The final set of explanatory variables contains demand side variables. As measures of market 
demand growth, the percentage growth of sales in the relevant market (lag_growth) is also 
considered at industry level in the current analysis. It had been noted in the literature review that 
collusion is easier to sustain in growing markets in which discounted future profits to be 
enjoyed are larger relative to today’s profits, and collusion is more difficult to sustain in 
markets characterized by declining demand, which implies that future profits are smaller 40 
 
compared to todays notwithstanding retaliation. However, this type of reasoning is invalid in 
the absence of a fixed number of market players. Stated more literally, growing demand 
might attract new entrants, which hampers collusion. In order to test this proposition, we have 
interacted demand growth with the ratio of the new entrant firms to all the firms in the 
industry that proxies entry barriers (lag_growth X lag_entry). 
 
Since we know about the existence of collusion in an industry conditional on exemption 
application, which implies that our sample might be non-random, we should also specify a 
selection equation. In the selection equation, the dependent variable is a binary variable 
which is one if there has been an exemption application, and zero if there is no exemption 
application. As to the explanatory variables, instead of lagged values we include current 
values of the same variables except the interaction term. Moreover, we also include another 
variable, cocompet, which is the average of the binary variables for firms indicating whether 
they are involved in collaboration with their competitors for innovation. We argue that the 
more collaboration for innovation with competitors in an industry, the more likely that firms 
seek antitrust immunity via Article 17 Mw for their concerted practices. 
 
Having explained the data and empirical strategy, we can now turn to estimation results 
which are displayed in the next section. 
 
5.  The Empirical Results 
This section displays the results of the estimation of the models described above. In Table III, 
we present the results of both the Probit models with sample selection and the simple Probit 
models with various specifications to provide a baseline of comparison. We report the 
marginal effects, calculated at the sample means in Table IV.  41 
 
 
First of all, the estimates of the correlation coefficient between error terms of the Probit 
equation and selection equation suggest that we should refer to selection models, since the 
correlation coefficient in all specifications are statistically significantly different from zero, 
which can be seen from atanh(rho) in Table III. This suggests that the parameter estimates in 
simple Probit models are plagued by sample selection bias, which indicates a major problem. 
Therefore, we restrict our attention to the results of the Probit model with sample selection 
when interpreting the estimation results. 
 
<INSERT TABLE III HERE> 
 
Having said that the results of the selection equation reveal that exemption application in 
Dutch industries is not random, we can promptly interpret the results. First of all, even though 
increased interaction in the market in the form of collaboration with their competitors for 
innovation (cocompet) seems to be associated with the increased likelihood of exemption 
application, its impact is imprecise. Similarly, it is also interesting to notice that there is no 
significant association between advertising intensity (advertising) and the propensity to ask 
for antitrust immunity. On the other hand, the less concentrated an industry is, the more likely 
that there is an exemption application, as hhi is statistically significant in all specifications (at 
5 % and 1 % levels). Elsewhere, increases in import competition (import) reduces the 
expected probability of exemption application in an industry, so do the innovative output 
measured as the ratio of firms with at least one patent application (patent) and the percentage 
growth of sales in the relevant market (growth), as the coefficients on all these variables are 
statistically significantly negative in each specification (at 1 % level). Conversely, the 
coefficients on the usage ratio of trade associations as information resources (infotrade) and 42 
 
the ratio of the new entrant firms to all the firms in the industry (entry) as a proxy for entry 
barriers are statistically significantly positive (at 1 % level) in each specification, implying 
that these variables appear to increase the likelihood of exemption application in an industry.  
 
The results of the Probit equation provide strong evidence that concerted practices are less 
likely to be seen in service industries relative to manufacturing industries, since the 
coefficient of service is statistically significantly (at 1 % significance level) negative in all 
specifications. The marginal effects of service on the expected probability of collusion when 
there is no exemption application as demonstrated in Table IV imply that it is 22-34 % less 
likely to encounter a concerted practice in a service industry compared to manufacturing 
industry.  
 
The results also suggest that the incidence of concerted practices is lower in concentrated 
industries: the coefficient on lag_hhi  is negative and everywhere statistically significant 
(except model 3) at the 1 % level. This means that it is more likely that firms engaged in 
concerted practices in unconcentrated industries, everything else being equal. A potential 
explanation for this finding is that industries with a relatively smaller number of firms might 
have been able to coordinate tacitly without any necessity of overt collusion. Alternatively, 
cartels might have prevailed in unconcentrated industries thanks to the role played by trade 
associations.  Indeed,  the link between trade association  and the presence of a concerted 
practice seems to be consistent with this latter interpretation: the coefficient on lag_infotrade 
is statistically significantly positive at the 1 % or the 5 % level in all specifications except 
model 3. The median of the concerted practice participants, which is 57, also indicates that 
trade associations were crucial to bring all those firms together to involve in restrictive 
practices.   43 
 
 
Elsewhere, the coefficient on the square of concentration measure imply that there is no non-
linear relationship between concentration and the presence of collusion, as it is statistically 
insignificantly positive (Model 1 and Model 5) or statistically significantly negative (Model 
3) in various specifications. 
 
There is also strong evidence from all the regressions that concerted practices are less likely 
in industries where entry is more possible: the coefficients on lag_entry are negative and 
significant at the 1 %, 5 % or 10 % levels. A potential explanation for the negative 
association between entry and collusion is that in contestable industries where barriers to 
entry are low firms might be less eager to collude, since their coordination would only invite 
entry by outsiders, which would make the incumbents worse off anyhow. On the other hand, 
a more reasonable explanation would be that absent any entry, the identities of main rivals do 
not change frequently, which makes coordination and monitoring among firms less difficult.  
 
Interestingly, our estimation results indicate that there is a positive correlation between cartel 
prevalence and import penetration: lag_import enters statistically significantly (at the 1 % 
and 5 % levels) to all regressions with a positive sign. This implies that import competition 
did not discipline firm behavior. This finding is also consistent with the analysis of Konings 
et al. (2001), which revealed that import competition did not result in lower price cost 
margins, and concluded that foreign importers joined the cartel paradise in the Netherlands.    
 
As to the role of measures of asymmetry on concerted practice prevalence, the association 
between patenting activity and propensity to engage in collusion is ambiguous in the current 
setting: the coefficient on lag_patent is statistically insignificant in all specifications in spite 44 
 
of being negative. Thus, our hypothesis stating that the probability of collusion decreases with 
innovative output has not been confirmed.  On the other hand, the coefficient on the second 
measure of asymmetry, lag_advertising, is statistically significantly positive at 10 % level in 
all specifications. This suggests that advertisement costs serve as entry barriers which increase 
the likelihood of collusion instead of being a proxy for vertical differentiation under which 
collusion is less likely.  
 
Contrary to the previous empirical findings, market growth (lag_growth) has been found to have 
a negative effect on the probability of a concerted practice in an industry. Seemingly, the 
theoretical prediction that collusion is easier to sustain under higher rates of growth has been 
offset by other mechanisms that we cannot observe in the current setting. A possible explanation 
might be that higher demand uncertainties that are arising from fast growth might dominate the 
effect of growth itself. Furthermore, our proposition that growing demand might attract new 
entrants, which, in turn, hampers collusion has been falsified in the current context, as the 
coefficient on the interaction term consisting of demand growth and the ratio of the new 
entrant firms to all the firms in the industry that proxies entry barriers (lag_growth X 
lag_entry) is statistically significantly positive (at 1 % level) in all specifications where it is 
included. 
 
<INSERT TABLE IV HERE> 
 
In Table IV we also display the marginal effects of covariates on the probability of collusion 
when there is no exemption application E[collusion=1, exemption=0] at sample means. This 
is the most interesting case, since it allows us to make inferences about industries where there 
might be concerted practices but no exemption application. In line with the results discussed 
above, the marginal effects indicate that increases in firms’ usage of trade associations as 45 
 
information resources (lag_infotrade) and increases in foreign competition gauged by the shares 
of total imports in total sales in a given industry (lag_import) is linked to the increased 
probability of finding a concerted practice in an industry where there is no exemption 
application. On the other hand, if entry, proxied by the ratio of the new entrant firms to all the 
firms in the industry (lag_entry), concentration, measured by Hirshman-Herfindahl Index 
(lag_hhi), and market growth, gauged by the percentage growth of sales in the relevant market 
(lag_growth) increase, it is less likely to encounter a concerted practice in these industries. 
Interestingly, the higher the advertising costs, the more likely to see concerted practices.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
As stated by Harrington (2008), developing structural screens is a cost-effective method for 
identifying industries where practices by firms are sufficiently indicative of the presence of 
collusion. These structural screens might also be employed by regulatory authorities as a part 
of their activist policy of screening for collusion so that cartel detection process is initiated by 
these screens rather than complaints from competitors and/or buyers, and leniency programs. 
 
When  developing structural screens in which industry characteristics bearing on the 
likelihood of collusion are assessed, the endogeneity of market structure and non-random 
sample problems should be taken into account. Among former similar studies, Symeonidis 
(2003) is the only one which tackles the problem of endogeneity. However, in his analysis of 
restrictive agreements for which registration was mandatory under the 1956 Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act,  he argues that non-registration of agreements would not result in sample 
selection bias, since collusive arrangements of all kinds were not enforceable in the court by 
then. Nevertheless, just as the former Dutch Economic Competition Act’s main touchstone 
was the “general interest”,  the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act’s standard for the 46 
 
restrictive agreements to be registered was “public interest”. Only the subset of restrictive 
agreements of which positive benefits outweighed the foreseen detriments or, agreements that 
were  considered by the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements as not substantially 
affecting competition were allowed to be retained. Even though he makes use of secondary 
information resources in his analysis to verify that sample selection does not pose a problem 
in his setting, he does not formally test it. 
 
This study is the first empirical study on industry characteristics bearing on the likelihood of 
collusion which tackles sample selection problem. Since there is not a formal econometric 
procedure to handle both endogeneity and sample selection issues simultaneously, we have 
considered using lagged values of explanatory variables to alleviate the endogeneity problem, 
short of using instrumental variables. Having reviewed the empirical literature on industry 
characteristics bearing on the likelihood of collusion, in order to develop a variant of the 
structural screens mentioned above, the current study has examined the impact of several 
industry characteristics on the propensity  to collude using a dataset on the existence of 
collusion across Dutch industries during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The final sample 
employed for the econometric analysis of the presence of collusion in this paper contains 112 
industries. The econometric results, inter alia, suggest that our sample of Dutch concerted 
practices is non-random in the sense that it only consists of anti-competitive agreements that 
were subject of an antitrust immunity seeking  behavior. Our bivariate probit model with 
sample selection indicates that concerted practices are less likely to be seen in service 
industries relative to manufacturing industries. The results also show that it is more likely that 
firms engaged in concerted practices in unconcentrated industries, everything else being 
equal. The relevant explanation for this counter-intuitive finding is that cartels prevailed in 
unconcentrated industries thanks to the trade associations that brought all those firms together 47 
 
to involve in restrictive practices. Furthermore, we could not find a non-linear relationship 
between concentration and the presence of collusion. 
 
There is also strong evidence from all the regressions that concerted practices are less likely 
in industries where entry is more possible. Interestingly, our estimation results indicate that 
there is a positive correlation between cartel prevalence and import penetration, which 
implies that import competition did not discipline firm behavior and foreign importers joined 
the cartel paradise in the Netherlands. As to the role of measures of asymmetry on concerted 
practice prevalence, the association between patenting activity and propensity to engage in 
collusion is ambiguous in the current setting, while advertising intensity, as the second 
measure of asymmetry, is associated with increased likelihood of collusion. This second 
counter-intuitive finding of the analysis can be explained by the fact that advertisement costs 
can also serve as entry barriers which increase the likelihood of collusion.  
 
Contrary to the previous empirical findings, market growth has been found to have a negative 
effect on the probability of a concerted practice in an industry. Seemingly, the theoretical 
prediction that collusion is easier to sustain under higher rates of growth has been offset by other 
mechanisms that we cannot observe in the current setting. A possible explanation might be that 
higher demand uncertainties that are arising from fast growth might dominate the effect of growth 
itself. Furthermore, our proposition that growing demand might attract new entrants, which, in 
turn, hampers collusion, has been falsified in the current context.  
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Appendix 
The Chronology of the Developments in the Dutch Competition Law 
1935: The Business Agreements Act (Ondernemersovereenkomstenwet) 
  The first Dutch national legislation 
  Main aim: to curtail the deleterious effects of excessive (domestic) competition on 
prices and employment. => it inclined the approbation of anti-competitive agreements 
and the government, if seen necessary, even made it compulsory to join an agreement 
for firms rejecting participation.  
 
1941: Cartel Decree (Kartelbesluit) of 1941 
  Compelled by the Nazi government of occupation 
  Formed a confidential cartel register without providing any sanctions for non-
acquiescence. 
  Remained intact for the following ten years 
 
1951: The Suspension of Business Regulation Act  
  Interim legislation. 
  Fight against cartels operating against the public interest 
  Wijsen (1956) reports that over a period of six years the government litigated 36 
cartels, in 14 of which it had acknowledged agreements to be unenforceable while in a 
further 19 cases it declared that the cartel had been amended convincingly. 
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1956: The Economic Competition Act (Wet Economische Mededinging)
13
  It maintained the cartel register and extended its coverage in a way to include 
banking, insurance and transport industries. 
  
  Liberal professions were excluded from the terms of the Act. 
  The Act still allowed the minister to compel a cartel agreement on the industry as a 
whole conditional on: 
•  That participants of the agreement demand this. Namely, the government cannot 
commence such a procedure, 
•  That participants of the agreement represent a “substantial majority” of the 
industry, 
•  And that the extension to the agreement is in line with public interest and interests 
of the industry. 
 
1971: The first EC decision conveying that a cartel among Dutch firms had violated Article 
81 TEC came.  
 
1977: The EC banned the  system of collective exclusive dealing among Dutch bicycle 
dealers, even though it had been allowed after some adjustments under the Economic 
Competition Act of 1956. 
 
1992: The EC decided that the Dutch construction cartel, which was a purely national cartel 
by nature, was in violation of Article 81(1) TEC and imposed a fine of 22.498 million ECU 
(5.2.1992, Building and construction industry in the Netherlands). This decision was later 
ratified by the European Court of First Instance. In addition to that the EC initiated a 
                                                           
13 became operative in 1958. 50 
 
procedure against the Dutch government based on Article 226 TEC. More precisely, it argued 
that the Dutch competition law and administrative practices, inter alia the industry’s 
agreements, impeded the proper functioning of the European competition rules.  
 
1990s: strengthening of anti-cartel policy within the existing framework. Apart from a more 
alert policy of dealing with cartel complaints, this embraced a series of general prohibitions 
against: 
 
1993: Prohibition on horizontal price agreements (effective from July 1993) 
 
1994: Prohibition on market sharing agreements and collusive tendering agreements 
(effective from June 1994) 
 
1998: The Competition Act (Mededingingswet)  
 
2004: The amendment of the Competition Act 
 
2005: The NMa was awarded the status of Autonomous Administrative Authority. 
 
2007: The NMa has been granted additional powers. 
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Tables  
Table I: The Distribution of Provisions in the Horizontal Agreements of which Details 
were published by the MEA in 1989 
The Provision(s) in the Horizontal Agreement  Percentages 
Joint tendering with no other provisions  24% 
Joint tendering + Conditions criteria  4% 
Joint tendering + Exclusivity clauses  7% 
Price fixing with no other provisions  4% 
Price fixing + Market sharing  17% 
Price fixing + Production, sales or marketing quotas  14% 
Price fixing + Conditions criteria  12% 
Price fixing + Exclusivity clauses  8% 




Table II: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
Manufacturing  Service  All 
Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
STRUCTURAL 
VARIABLES 
           
service          0.4606  0.4985 
lag_hhi  0.1598  0.1692  0.0514  0.0672  0.1331  0.1577 
lag_hhi_2  0.0541  0.1337  0.0072  0.0209  0.0426  0.1183 
lag_infotrade  0.0263  0.1195  0.0177  0.0786  0.0221  0.1016 
lag_entry  0.0741  0.1127  0.1018  0.0828  0.0858  0.1021 
lag_import  49.9900  22.9736  9.4491  13.7449  32.9113  28.0316 
SUPPLY SIDE VARIABLES             
lag_patent  0.1677  0.1809  0.0300  0.1268  0.1009  0.1714 
lag_advertising  0.0132  0.0168  0.0144  0.0256  0.0135  0.0194 
DEMAND SIDE 
VARIABLES 
           
lag_growth  0.0727  0.4606  0.1004  0.5507  0.0797  0.4848 
lag_growth X lag_entry  0.0083  0.1282  0.0095  0.0874  0.0085  0.1220 
SELECTION EQUATION 
VARIABLES 
           
infotrade  0.1192  0.1164  0.0657  0.0797  0.0931  0.1037 
hhi  0.1571  0.1812  0.0579  0.0606  0.1330  0.1660 
entry  0.0909  0.0729  0.1114  0.0764  0.0994  0.0751 
patent  0.1195  0.1124  0.0975  0.1057  0.1089  0.1098 
advertising  0.0150  0.0173  0.0171  0.0266  0.0155  0.0200 
growth  0.1225  0.6642  0.0717  0.2855  0.1099  0.5934 
cocompet  0.0676  0.0961  0.0536  0.0901  0.0607  0.0935 
import  50.3278  23.2852  9.3000  13.3477  33.1524  28.2757 58 
 
Table III: The Results of the Probit Models with Sample Selection and the Simple 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table III: The Results of the Probit Models with Sample Selection and the Simple 
Probit Models for the Impact of Industry Characteristics on the Likelihood of 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































•  *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level 
•  z-statistics are based on robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 60 
 
Table IV: The Marginal Effects of the Covariates on the Expected Likelihood of 
Concerted Practice Occurrence When There is no Exemption Application at Sample 




Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
dy/dx  dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx  
service  -0.3025  **  -0.3366  ***  -0.3271  ***  -0.2199  *  -0.3069  ** 
  (0.1299)    (0.1296)    (0.1022)    (0.1191)    (0.1261)   
lag_hhi  -4.3700  ***  -4.6138  ***  -2.0394    -1.3092  *  -4.4575  *** 
  (1.4689)    (1.5064)    (1.6826)    (0.7098)    (1.3691)   
lag_hhi_2  5.0707  *      -23.3474  ***      5.1799  * 
  (3.0080)        (8.4421)        (3.0446)   
lag_infotrade  0.6386  **  0.7937  **  0.8719  **  0.2208    0.6334  * 
  (0.3223)    (0.3689)    (0.4215)    (0.2000)    (0.3244)   
lag_entry  -1.8598  **  -2.2855  **  -2.5034  **  -1.2501  *  -1.8833  ** 
  (0.9185)    (1.0666)    (1.2380)    (0.7563)    (0.9090)   
lag_import  0.0040  **  0.0051  **  0.0066  **  0.0029  **  0.0039  ** 
  (0.0016)    (0.0020)    (0.0026)    (0.0013)    (0.0016)   
lag_patent  -0.0364    -0.0388    -0.2012    -0.1594       
  (0.1305)    (0.1653)    (0.2447)    (0.1066)       
lag_advertising  5.8081  *  7.2713  *  8.3894  *  3.9628  *  5.8755  * 
  (3.2316)    (4.0098)    (4.4937)    (2.3573)    (3.2492)   
lag_growth  -1.0666  ***  -1.2150  ***  -0.0293    0.0219    -1.0947  *** 
  (0.3058)    (0.3959)    (0.1163)    (0.0696)    (0.2772)   
lag_growth X lag_entry  8.3141  ***  9.2477  ***          8.5154  *** 
  (2.3927)    (2.7927)            (2.2052)   
 
•  *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level 
•  z-statistics are based on robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 
 